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## Alt Ans

### State Militarism Inevitable- Evolution

#### Dominance behavior and hierarchies are evolutionarily constant across vastly different species

Johnson, PhD, and Thayer, PhD, 16

(Dominic D. P., PhD from Geneva University in political science, and Bradley, Department of Political Science and Geography at UT San Antonio (2016). The evolution of offensive realism: Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present. Politics and the Life Sciences, 35(1), 1-26.)//bc

Evolutionary theory can also explain dominance. Like egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait of human nature (which, as with egoism, we stress does not necessarily apply to every individual or situation but is a statistical tendency underlying behavior). As evolutionary economist Robert Frank has explained, ‘‘Evidence suggests that we come into the world equipped with a nervous system that worries about rank. Something inherent in our biological makeup motivates us to try to improve, or at least maintain, our standing against those with whom we compete for important positional resources.’’94 In the context of evolutionary theory, dominance usually means that particular individuals in a social group have priority of access to resources in competitive situations.95 A wide variety of animals exhibit a form of social organization called a dominance hierarchy, in which members of a social group each have a status rank descending from the alpha male down through all the other individuals to the lowliest subordinates. A dominance hierarchy is created competitively, often violently, and is maintained forcefully, but it can serve to prevent or reduce conflict within a group because it establishes a pecking order that is generally respected. As with all things in nature, dominance hierarchies vary considerably. Hierarchies may be weak or strong, and ‘‘alpha’’ males may sire nearly all offspring or just more than others. However, what is striking is the prevalence and potency of dominance in social organization, despite variations in the specifics. Dominance behavior occurs in thousands of taxonomic groups ranging from fish and reptiles to birds and mammals. Of particular note regarding the impact of dominance on human behavior are the roles of both phylogeny (a species’ ancestral lineage) and ecology (its adaptations to local conditions). With regard to phylogeny, most primates and all the great apes (the group to which humans belong) have strong social dominance hierarchies, and humans are no exception—dominance hierarchies have been extensively documented among humans in a wide variety of settings and eras.96,97,98 With regard to ecology, dominance hierarchies are a common form of social organization in the kind of ecological settings in which humans evolved (social groups with competing interests, variation in power, and finite resources). The strength of dominance hierarchies in humans is debated and varies empirically, but such hierarchies are always evident in some form or other. Even where dominance hierarchies are actively suppressed, such as in more egalitarian small-scale societies, suppression itself is evidence of the competition for status that simmers beneath the surface.99 In historical and contemporary societies, competition for power is all too obvious, and the quest for status, dominance, and leadership is ancient and ever present.100,101,102,103 Males of most mammal species are particularly competitive with each other over females. Indeed, the competition for mates is subject to a special type of evolutionary selection process—sexual selection, as opposed to standard natural selection. Reproductive access to females tends to be highly skewed, with a few males responsible for a large proportion of progeny. This is because a single male can reproduce with multiple females, whereas females can usually only reproduce and rear the offspring of one male at a time, with a long delay before becoming reproductively available again. In some species, reproductive access is settled by coercion, in which the strongest male defeats rivals to dominate a harem. In other species, males cannot coerce females, but the females are choosy about with whom they mate, leading to selection pressures for males to demonstrate or signal their quality as attractive partners. In either case, it is females rather than males that are the limiting factor in sexual competition, making male competition for available females intense. Sexual selection has led to costly biological adaptations, such as fighting, the growth of heavy ‘‘weapons’’ (e.g., antlers), risky courtship displays, or adornments that signal genetic quality (e.g., gigantic tails). These types of adaptations not only consume precious time and energy but can also decrease survival in other, nonreproductive domains of life (for example, the plumage of male peacocks limits their ability to fly). Thus, the power of sexual selection can lead to the evolution of traits that actually damage survival in order to achieve superiority over other males.104,105 Reproduction trumps survival in evolution. Sexual selection is typically responsible for the hierarchical nature of group-living animal species, including humans, as males fight for rank and the reproductive benefits in brings. As we would expect, this leads to sex differences in the desire for status. Both laboratory experiments and real-world observations have identified empirical differences between men and women in a range of social behaviors, not least that men tend to have relative-gains, or ‘‘zero-sum’’ motivations (wanting to get ahead at the expense of others), whereas women tend to favor payoff-maximization, or ‘‘variable-sum’’ motivations (content to do well even if others also do well in the process).106,107,108,109 It is well established that dominance and statusseeking behaviors in humans are based on many of the same biochemical and neurological processes as in other mammals, such as the secretion and uptake of testosterone and serotonin, which modify status-challenging behavior.110,111 However rational we may like to think we are, our judgments and decision-making are nevertheless influenced by cognitive mechanisms and biochemicals circulating in our bodies and brains that relate to dominance behavior.112,113,114,115 Dominance hierarchies need not only benefit those at the top. An organized social structure can help promote the harvesting of resources, coordinate group activity, and reduce within-group conflict. Although alphas in the hierarchy tend to have the highest reproductive success, other males may benefit from group membership by gaining protection from other groups, or by biding their time for a chance to challenge the alpha male when they become strong enough or old enough. Ethological studies have shown that hierarchical dominance systems within a primate group’s social network can reduce overt aggression, although aggression increases again when the alpha male is challenged.116,117,118 To summarize, a species that lives communally could have two broad forms of social organization. The group can accept organization with some centralization of power (dominance hierarchies), or it can engage in perpetual conflict (‘‘scramble competition’’), which incurs costs in terms of time, energy, and injuries, as well as depriving the group of many benefits of a communal existence, such as more efficient resource harvesting.119 Among social mammals, and primates in particular, dominance hierarchies have emerged as the primary form of social organization. Thus far, we have emphasized a state of ‘‘anarchy’’ in evolutionary history, in which there was no overarching power to provide protection from predators, rivals, or other threats. Egoism and dominance arose as strategies that provided solutions to achieving survival and reproduction in this environment. However, dominance hierarchies were in some sense a mechanism by which this anarchy could be suppressed—at least within the group—to the benefit of all group members since they share at least some common interests (such as avoiding conflict). This collective benefit points to the special and much more significant role of anarchy at a higher level—anarchy between groups. As we show in the next section, competition between groups is especially significant for human evolution, and for international politics, precisely because it is at the intergroup level where anarchy reigns supreme and is much harder to suppress.

#### States’ tendencies towards aggression and selfishness are derived from the evolutionary need to maintain dominance hierarchies

Thayer, PhD, 4

(Bradley A., Department of Political Science and Geography at UT San Antonio. Darwin and International Relations : On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, University Press of Kentucky, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=1914962.)//bc>

Evolutionary theory can also explain domination. Like egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait. In the context of evolutionary theory, domination usually means that particular individuals in social groups have regular priority of access to resources in competitive situations. For most social mammals, a form of social organization called a dominance hierarchy operates most of the time. The creation of the dominance hierarchy may be violent and is almost always competitive. A single leader, almost always male (the alpha male), leads the group. The ubiquity of this social ordering strongly suggests that such a pattern of organization contributes to fitness. Ethologists categorize two principal types of behavior among social mammals in a dominance hierarchy: dominant and submissive.56 Dominant mammals have enhanced access to mates, food, and territory, increasing their chances of reproductive success.57 Acquiring dominant status usually requires aggression.58 Dominance, however, is an unstable condition; to maintain it, dominant individuals must be willing to defend their privileged access to available resources as long as they are able. Evolutionary anthropologist Richard Wrangham and ethologist Dale Peterson explain why an individual animal is motivated to vie for dominant status: "The motivation of a male chimpanzee who challenges another's rank is not that he foresees more matings or better food or a longer life."59 Rather, "those rewards explain why ... selection has favored the desire for power, but the immediate reason he vies for status ... is simply to dominate his peers."60 Dominant animals often assume behavior reflecting their status. For example, dominant wolves and rhesus monkeys hold their tails higher than other members of their group in an effort to communicate dominance. A dominant animal that engages in such displays is better off if it can gain priority of access to resources without having to fight for it continuously.61 Such signaling behavior is found among submissive social mammals as well. They often try to be as inconspicuous as possible and recognize what is permitted and forbidden given their place in the hierarchy. This behavior shows that the subordinate accepts its place in the dominance hierarchy and-at least temporarily-will make no effort to challenge the dominant animal. Ethologists argue that dominance hierarchies evolve because they help defend against predators, promote the harvesting of resources, and reduce intragroup conflict.62 A species that lives communally has two choices. It can either accept organization with some centralization of power, or engage in perpetual conflict over scarce resources, which may result in serious injury and deprive the group of the benefits of a communal existence, such as more efficient resource harvesting.63 Ethological studies have confirmed that a hierarchical dominance system within a primate band minimizes overt aggression and that group aggression often increases when the alpha male is challenged.64 For primates and especially humans, the dominance hierarchy may have produced a fortuitous result: great intelligence.65 As cognitive psychologist Denise Dellarosa Cummins argues, it has had a profound effect on human evolution: "The fundamental components of our reasoning architecture evolved in response to pressures to reason about dominance hierarchies, the social organization that characterizes most social mammals."66 Her study and others have found that dominance hierarchies have contributed to the evolution of the mind, which in turn has contributed to fitness. According to Cummins, submissive individuals can detect, exploit, and circumvent the constraints of domination. If an animal can take what it wants by force, it is sure to dominate the available resources-unless its subordinates are smart enough to outwit it. To survive, a subordinate must use other strategies: deception, guile, appeasement, bartering, alliance formation, or friendship. Thus intelligence is particularly important to the survival of subordinates. "The evolution of mind emerges," Cummins writes, "as a strategic arms race in which the weaponry is ever-increasing mental capacity to represent and manipulate internal representations of the minds of others."67 From their studies of chimpanzee societies, ethologists have learned that the struggle for survival is best characterized as a struggle between those who are dominant and those seeking to outwit them, i.e., between recognizing an opponent's intentions and hiding one's own. The following example illustrates how a subordinate chimpanzee, Belle, who knows the location of hidden food, attempts to deceive Rock, who is dominant: Belle accordingly stopped uncovering the food if Rock was close. She sat on it until Rock left. Rock, however, soon learned this, and when she sat in one place for more than a few seconds, he came over, shoved her aside, searched her sitting place, and got the food. Belle next stopped going all the way [to the food]. Rock, however, countered by steadily expanding the area of his search through the grass near where Belle had sat. Eventually, Belle sat farther and farther away, waiting until Rock looked in the opposite direction before she moved toward the food at all, and Rock in turn seemed to look away until Belle started to move somewhere. On some occasions Rock started to wander off, only to wheel around suddenly precisely as Belle was about to uncover some food .... On a few trials, she actually started off a trail by leading the group in the opposite direction from the food, and then, while Rock was engaged in his search, she doubled back rapidly and got some food. 68 Despite the "arms race" described by Cummins to outwit dominance, the subordinate members of the group continue to participate in the dominance hierarchy because doing so increases the chances of survival. As ethologist David Barash explains, if subordinates "are more fit by accepting" subordinate "ranking than by refusing to participate, then some form of social dominance hierarchy will result."69 Humans and other primates evolved a mental architecture to address the difficulties they encountered in dominance hierarchies. These problems, which "directly impact survival rates and reproductive success," include two crucial needs: "the necessity to recognize and respond appropriately to permissions, obligations, and prohibition," and the necessity "to circumvent the constraints of hierarchy by dint of guile, particularly through successfully forecasting others' behavior. "70 Because human mental architecture was created through evolution, it remains part of human behavior today, as cognitive psychology studies show. 71

### State Militarism Inevitable- Realism

#### **Realism’s mechanism for change is War**

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Realism is most often depicted as a tradition or perspective on international relations explaining war and military conflict. This is not without reason as realists have focused on war as a major or even the primary mechanism of change in international relations. Thucydides, in The History of the Peloponnesian War, written in the fifth century BC, and a standard reference in textbook accounts of the realist tradition, found that ‘[t]he growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable’ (Thucydides 431 BC, 1.23). This position is echoed in realism up until today. For instance, in his modern classic, aptly entitled War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin asserts that ‘a precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power towards those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system’, and that change in international relations typically equals war (Gilpin 1981, 9). Likewise, John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, argues that the most war-prone regions are those characterised by unbalanced multipolarity with a potential hegemon seeking to change the established order in its favour by military means, and that the growth of China constitutes the greatest danger to world peace (Mearsheimer 2001). This does not mean that realists are unconcerned with peace. Acting as policy advisors or foreign policy commentators, realists have often been among the most vocal critics of war. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, arguably the two most prominent realists in the latter half of the twentieth century, were both highly critical of US military intervention in Vietnam (Rafshoon 2001; Humphreys 2013). More recently, ‘almost all realists in the United States – except for Henry Kissinger – opposed the war against Iraq’ in 2003 (Mearsheimer 2005), and realists have been highly critical of the US military interventions during the Obama administration from 2009 to 2017 (Walt 2016). However, despite this concern with peace, war remains the primary mechanism for change in realist theory, and realists have been surprisingly reluctant to explore the potential for peaceful change.

#### Realism makes militarization and use of military power inevitable- states have a vested interest in armed force

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Political Realism sees international relations mainly as a struggle of self-interested, sovereign states that are involved in a game of power-politics within a permanent state of anarchy. The international system, according to this school of thought, is a moral- and value-free environment in which the state is seen as a rational and unitary actor that finds itself in constant conflict with the other states of the system due to the lack of an overarching world government. Stemming from their pessimistic view on human nature, the only way to achieve security in the international system, according to political realism, is by creating a Balance of Power among the most powerful states of the system. As briefly mentioned earlier, both political thinkers pick up on the realist view of the international system as a value- and moral-free place of anarchy, where states live under a constant fear of attack or betrayal by others and thus are facing a Security Dilemma. Thucydides, taking up the issue of anarchy within the international system, very much agrees with the realist point of view, saying that in a system where there is no overarching authority, the only way to maintain order is through some form of Balance of Power, which – in the case of Thucydides – takes the form of the strong exercising their power over the weak. Hobbes, in comparison, takes quite a different look at this. Stemming from his theory about the ‘State of Nature’, he admits that without a world government, the system is subject to a state of anarchy and of “a war as is of every man against every man”[1]. However, Hobbes opposes the view that under such conditions it is the strong who determine the order of the international system. According to his theory of the ‘State of Nature’, every man is equal and thus “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.”[2]. The order, according to Hobbes, is rather maintained by a “general rule of reason”[3] which is that “every man ought to endeavour peace”[4] and since every man is equal in strength and desires, there is certainty that this principle will be followed as long as one’s own security is not endangered. This leads on to the realist claim of a moral- and value-free international system. He also claims that peace and security in an international system without an overarching authority can only be achieved through cooperation between states and between individuals. This leads on to the next point which has to be made about the view of Hobbes and Thucydides on individuals and states: cooperation. Political realism sees no actual possibility for states to form successful alliances, as no state can be trusted since it only relies on its self-interest and does not pay much attention to what would happen to other states in the system. Thucydides takes a similar stand as he – although not ignoring the possibility – is very sceptical of the chances of success of such a form of cooperation given the anarchic structure of the international system and solely self-interested states. Hobbes, on the other hand, does recognise the limitations mentioned above, however he also says that due to the fact that all states are equal within the international system, they can “create more stable forms of coexistence among themselves”[8] and thus establish peace and security.

### War = Human Nature

#### **War is inevitable and a part of human nature**

Perry 19 (Craig Perry, emerging fellow and professional futurist, February 24 2019, “IS ANOTHER GREAT-POWER WAR INEVITABLE?” APF, <https://www.apf.org/blogpost/1763106/318624/Is-Another-Great-Power-War-Inevitable)-Cayden> Mayer

A century ago, with the world embroiled in what was then naively dubbed the “war to end all wars,” few people imagined a second global conflagration igniting just a generation later. Since the end of World War II, however, humanity has experienced over seven decades of relative peace, with the frequency of war deaths trending sharply downward throughout this period. This is largely attributable to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, a standoff that spawned numerous proxy conflicts but never turned truly hot. It remains to be seen whether the ongoing reemergence of a multipolar world, with potentially several states capable of exerting influence on a global scale, will lead to yet more wars among these so-called great powers. There are good reasons to fear a return to great-power conflict. Warfare has been endemic to the human condition since the dawn of civilization, and remains the ultimate way of resolving conflicts among states even in the modern era. World affairs are inherently anarchic, with states pursuing their own advantages in a Hobbesian struggle of each against all. While the weak may occasionally band together to balance would-be hegemons, the prevailing self-help system of international relations features no permanent friends or enemies, just interests. “Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict,” the late neo-realist scholar Kenneth Waltz noted. “Why should the future be different from the past?” Indeed, war has accompanied the rise and fall of great powers throughout recorded history. In his classic account of the Peloponnesian War, Greek historian Thucydides concluded that the growth of Athenian power and the fear this inspired in then-dominant Sparta made war between these city-states inevitable. This dynamic, which political scientist Graham Allison calls the “Thucydides Trap,” has ensnared rising and established powers in more than a dozen wars over the last 500 years—and it threatens to do so again as other states challenge the United States for global influence. Such systemic, structural factors are not the only aspects of international relations that can drive states towards armed conflict. Marxists argue that capitalism compels the core, industrialized powers to compete for dominance as they exploit peripheral countries for labor and raw materials. Political scientist Samuel Huntington suggested it is culture—rather than ideology, politics, or economics—that is shaping patterns of conflict, with the Western belief in the universality of its values leading to clashes with rival civilizations. Constructivists similarly believe ideas shape international relations, as each state perceives world events in its own peculiar way. So why should the future be different from the past? With nearly 200 sovereign states around the globe, it seems inevitable that at least some of them will come into conflict in the coming decades—and great powers will occasionally intervene if only to enforce international law or for some other ostensibly noble purpose. Yet it is far from certain that these great powers will again come to blows with each other, for several reasons. While anarchy will continue to characterize international relations for the foreseeable future, a number of developments—including nuclear deterrence, globalization of trade and investment, relevant international institutions, shifting social norms, and widespread competition below the threshold of war—are incrementally reducing the likelihood of another great-power conflict. Will these trends be enough to prevent the eventual outbreak of World War III?

#### Aggression is biological — psychological adaptations determine reactions to conflict

Klasios, 19 – Researcher for York University (John, "Aggression among men: An integrated evolutionary explanation", Science Direct, July-August 2019, Vol. 47, p. 29-45))SK

\*\*we do not endorse gendered language

A number of biosocial [criminologists](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/criminologist) have attempted to illuminate aggression (as well as crime and [delinquency](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/social-sciences/delinquency) more generally) in terms of its [heritability](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/heritability). Here, my aim will be twofold: First, to bridge behavior genetics with the [explanatory model](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/psychology/explanatory-model) developed in this paper, and then to briefly discuss the evolutionary processes that can act to generate heritable variation in traits connected to male aggression. Heritable variation in violent crime has been established by behavior geneticists (e.g., [Barnes et al., 2014](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0050); [DiLalla & Gheyara, 2011](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0205); [Ferguson, 2010](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0250); [Rhee & Waldman, 2002](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0570)).[7](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "fn0035) On the one hand, these studies show us how much of the variance in a given population, at a given time, can be explained by heritable factors. Yet on the other hand, heritability studies are largely silent on the mechanistic and developmental details that subserve the heritability of traits. In order to see how these two sides of the coin are interrelated, we can start by considering the concept of reactive heritability, which sketches how heritable traits express or magnify themselves developmentally (e.g., [Tooby & Cosmides, 1990](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0680); [von Rueden, Lukaszewski, & Gurven, 2015](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0585)). To illustrate how such processes can work, we can consider an example germane to aggression, whereby an individual inherits above average physical strength. From the figurative point-of-view of the underlying psychological adaptations that govern aggression (broadly speaking), and all else equal, it is unknown what the level of physical strength is in the organism that the adaptations are developing and operating in. However, it is possible that natural-selection can design such adaptations so that they can assess what the agent's physical strength level is—perhaps, for instance, by attending to feedback regarding how often, and to what degree, the agent is either successful or unsuccessful in physical [conflicts of interest](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/topics/social-sciences/conflict-of-interest) with other agents. Given these assessments, the underlying psychological adaptation can then compute an overall index of the agent's physical strength, and then utilize that index when judging if and when to instrumentally mete out aggression. Whether such an adaptation has actually evolved, and, if so, what its design features are, are of course empirical questions. However, evolutionary psychologists have indeed found experimental evidence that suggests that a psychological adaptation has evolved in men that can assess one's physical strength, and then use that assessment as an “internal regulatory variable” which governs, for instance, one's proneness to use anger as a bargaining tactic during conflicts of interest with other agents ([Sell, Cosmides, et al., 2009](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0620); [Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178918301666" \l "bb0625)).

#### War throughout history has always been caused by human nature and greed

Finucane ’13 (Matt Finucane, Russian and European foreign policy, speak intermediate Russian, hold an MA in International Relations and European Studies from the University of East Anglia, October 31st “Is War Primarily the Product of ‘Human Nature’?” E-International Relations <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/31/is-war-primarily-the-product-of-human-nature/>)

\*Modified for gendered language- Cayden Mayer

It is too great a task to identify a common cause of all wars, past and present, then attribute it responsibility for their commencing. However, what can be done is to identify certain foundations common in all “war”, and pay heed to how “states [or other structures] actually behave, behind the façade of their values-based rhetoric” (Kaplan, 2012, p.1). It will be this essay’s goal to determine first, what needs be included in the definition of “human nature”, and what constitutes “war”, and second, stake the claim that all political action, including that of states, is derived primarily from this definition of human nature. The first task is to define what is meant by “war”, and while definitions abound, it is possible to order them into one of two categories supplied by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. The first is the modern conventional view, that war is “the state of armed conflict between nations or states” (Oxford, 2007, p.3573), and the second, considerably broader, of “any active hostility or struggle between living beings” (Oxford, 2007, p.3573). The former accounts well for conflicts that were overwhelmingly state-centric, such as the First World War, and marks a clear distinction between war and individual political violence: war is the business of states. However, is the Vietnam War to be understood—like the Korean—as a simple north versus south conflict, despite the northern state only assuming active involvement nine years after indigenous fighting broke out in 1955? (Young, 1991, p. 123) The second category, while accounting correctly for the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, is in need of qualification, or else runs the unhelpful risk of equating all acts with warfare. While a simple merging of the two definitions would not suffice, there are some similarities to be observed. Both imply in the Clausewitzian sense that war is a tool used to achieve ends: “a continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz, 1989, p. 606). A state acts in its national interest, just as Islamist group Ansar al-Dine acts in its—and its people’s—religio-political interests in Mali (Welsh, 2013). The latter definition will be qualified by the observation that all actors engaged in war, be they NLF in Vietnam, or Ansar al-Dine in Mali, do so in hierarchical groups. “War” in this essay will be characterised by its employment by united, hierarchical structures, as a tool to achieve politics ends. While it is accepted that wars have an almost infinite number of unique causes, the pursuit of a primary explanation has a long tradition. From Christian teachings arose what Neorealist, Kenneth Waltz, refers to as the “pessimistic” view of human nature, its advocates attesting to a fixed and flawed humanity, man’s[1] inherent evil (Waltz, 2001, p. 26). Among them is Sir Norman Angell who in 1925 wrote of man, the “fighting animal, emotional, passionate, illogical…” (Angell, p. 7). It is their view that while rationality is pursued, it is—and will forever be—blighted by the underlying imperfections of humanity, among them, the propensity to war. The pessimist view endures, as do the principles established in 17th century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. That (hu)man will essentially pursue his own interests and this, in the absence of a higher power, will lead to conflict (Hobbes, 2008, pp. xxviii-xxx). In this state of anarchy (of no higher authority), of “war with every other man”, societies are apparently “few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroyed of all that pleasure, and beauty of life, which peace and society are wont to bring with them” (Hobbes, 2008, p. xxxi). Examples of such existences abound from the failed states of Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and it is for this reason that man yields his freedoms to authority, the only guarantor of peace. The philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, too observed that: “one man cannot begin to behave decently unless he has some assurance that others will not be able to ruin him” (Waltz, 2001, pp. 6-7); the state provides these assurances; this is why man assembles into states or other structures. The state assumes the role of provider, acting too as arbitrator within its territory while its constituents obey. But what of a world in which multiple states emerge? Waltz writes that “Among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is [again] associated with the occurrence of violence” (emphasis mine) (Waltz, 1986, p. 98). However, that is not to say these societies are “few, and fierce”, least of all “short-lived” as Hobbes predicted. Many states have long histories, and those that fail are clearly exceptions to the rule. What is really at fault here is the pessimist view that human nature is irrationally inclined to violence. As Waltz notes in his critique, “a static human nature cannot explain the differences in political outcomes. For example, one cannot explain both war and peace by arguing that man is wicked” (Griffiths, 1995, p. 66). Clearly there is another variable, without which human nature cannot suffice as the primary cause of war. This additional variable becomes apparent in further reading of Leviathan, specifically concerning the environment mankind inhabits. Hobbes writes of the state of nature, “If any two (hu)mans desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end […] endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another” (Hobbes, 2008, p. 83). While it might seem this competition for resources is an alternative to the human nature claim to war, as will be seen, it is only by the combination of this factor and another of human nature, that war can be given any primary cause. It must be argued that the base requirements for mankind’s survival are of such significance to human nature that the competition for these be included in its very definition. Survival, dependent first and foremost on the securing of these resources, and secondly on their protection, is integral to the causation of wars. However, there remains another question: why when two actors desire the same thing, does co-operation not play a greater role? The answer is again found deeply embedded in one of the facets of (hu)man. As Hobbes observed, there is a great distrust among men. That a (hu)man need fear those “prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive them, not only of the fruit of their labour, but also of their life or liberty”, is cause for him to “master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him” (Hobbes, 2008, p. 57). In Realist terms, this is known as the “security dilemma” (Waltz, 2001, p. 37), and is sourced from the knowledge that one can never know the true intentions of another, and so can rely only on oneself. The same is true for states, which are again proven to be “(hu)man writ large” in the words of Morgenthau (Griffiths, 1995, p. 66). John Mearsheimer refers to this as the “uncertainty of intentions”, and as a facet of human nature it has had disastrous consequences, most prominently in the beginning of the First World War. There had been an arms race in 1912 and 1913 all throughout Europe (Mulligan, 2010, p. 209) and when combined with high diplomatic tensions, and the scramble by Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and France to mobilise (Martel, 2003, pp. 2-3), a situation arose in which, states were unsure that “other states [did] not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities” (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 31). The likelihood of war here as a direct result of limitations imposed by human nature was irreversibly heightened, and the significance of this insurmountable fear—only dampened by defence spending—this limitation generates was exposed. Mearsheimer’s analysis, going further than the traditional Realist’s, concludes similarly to Hobbes’, that the only way to maintain security is to muster a power so great that no other can contest your strength. Writing on German eagerness for war in 1914, he claims it was “not a case of wacky strategic ideas pushing a state to start a war it was sure to lose” but “a calculated risk, motivated in large part by Germany’s desire to […] become Europe’s hegemon” (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 214). Here it can be seen that no matter how complex a state’s policy, its own ability to procure and defend resources—defined in terms of power—is always the primary aim. As Morgenthau writes on power “whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim” (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 29). Now that a culpable human nature has been established, it is now time to see where it stands among other theories of the causes of war.

#### **War is biologically engrained in human nature**

Wilson ’12 (E.O. Wilson, an American biologist, naturalist, and writer. June 12th 2021 “Is War Inevitable?” Liveright Publishing Corporation <https://www.pps.net/cms/lib/OR01913224/Centricity/Domain/3337/evolutionofwar.doc)-> Cayden Mayer

“History is a bath of blood,” wrote William James, whose 1906 antiwar essay is arguably the best ever written on the subject. “Modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors. Showing war’s irrationality and horror is of no effect on him. The horrors make the fascination. War is the strong life; it is life in extremis; war taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets of all nations show us.” Our bloody nature, it can now be argued in the context of modern biology, is ingrained because group-versus-group competition was a principal driving force that made us what we are. In prehistory, group selection (that is, the competition between tribes instead of between individuals) lifted the hominids that became territorial carnivores to heights of solidarity, to genius, to enterprise—and to fear. Each tribe knew with justification that if it was not armed and ready, its very existence was imperiled. Throughout history, the escalation of a large part of technology has had combat as its central purpose. Today the calendars of nations are punctuated by holidays to celebrate wars won and to perform memorial services for those who died waging them. Public support is best fired up by appeal to the emotions of deadly combat, over which the amygdala—a center for primary emotion in the brain—is grandmaster. We find ourselves in the “battle” to stem an oil spill, the “fight” to tame inflation, the “war” against cancer. Wherever there is an enemy, animate or inanimate, there must be a victory. You must prevail at the front, no matter how high the cost at home. Any excuse for a real war will do, so long as it is seen as necessary to protect the tribe. The remembrance of past horrors has no effect. From April to June in 1994, killers from the Hutu majority in Rwanda set out to exterminate the Tutsi minority, which at that time ruled the country. In a hundred days of unrestrained slaughter by knife and gun, 800,000 people died, mostly Tutsi. The total Rwandan population was reduced by 10 percent. When a halt was finally called, 2 million Hutu fled the country, fearing retribution. The immediate causes for the bloodbath were political and social grievances, but they all stemmed from one root cause: Rwanda was the most overcrowded country in Africa. For a relentlessly growing population, the per capita arable land was shrinking toward its limit. The deadly argument was over which tribe would own and control the whole of it. Universal conflict  Once a group has been split off from other groups and sufficiently dehumanized, any brutality can be justified, at any level, and at any size of the victimized group up to and including race and nation. And so it has ever been. A familiar fable is told to symbolize this pitiless dark angel of human nature. A scorpion asks a frog to ferry it across a stream. The frog at first refuses, saying that it fears the scorpion will sting it. The scorpion assures the frog it will do no such thing. After all, it says, we will both perish if I sting you. The frog consents, and halfway across the stream the scorpion stings it. Why did you do that, the frog asks as they both sink beneath the surface. It is my nature, the scorpion explains. War, often accompanied by genocide, is not a cultural artifact of just a few societies. Nor has it been an aberration of history, a result of the growing pains of our species’ maturation. Wars and genocide have been universal and eternal, respecting no particular time or culture. Archaeological sites are strewn with the evidence of mass conflicts and burials of massacred people. Tools from the earliest Neolithic period, about 10,000 years ago, include instruments clearly designed for fighting. One might think that the influence of pacific Eastern religions, especially Buddhism, has been consistent in opposing violence. Such is not the case. Whenever Buddhism dominated and became the official ideology, war was tolerated and even pressed as part of faith-based state policy. The rationale is simple, and has its mirror image in Christianity: Peace, nonviolence, and brotherly love are core values, but a threat to Buddhist law and civilization is an evil that must be defeated. Since the end of World War II, violent conflict between states has declined drastically, owing in part to the nuclear standoff of the major powers (two scorpions in a bottle writ large). But civil wars, insurgencies, and state-sponsored terrorism continue unabated. Overall, big wars have been replaced around the world by small wars of the kind and magnitude more typical of hunter-gatherer and primitively agricultural societies. Civilized societies have tried to eliminate torture, execution, and the murder of civilians, but those fighting little wars do not comply. Archaeologists have determined that after populations of Homo sapiens began to spread out of Africa approximately 60,000 years ago, the first wave reached as far as New Guinea and Australia. The descendants of the pioneers remained as hunter-gatherers or at most primitive agriculturalists, until reached by Europeans. Living populations of similar early provenance and archaic cultures are the aboriginals of Little Andaman Island off the east coast of India, the Mbuti Pygmies of Central Africa, and the !Kung Bushmen of southern Africa. All today, or at least within historical memory, have exhibited aggressive territorial behavior.

### Alt Fails – AT: Movements

#### Activist movements fail – they can’t produce concrete alternatives.

**Jones 11** [Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, [www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html)]

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled.¶ Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa.¶ Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning."¶ The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. ¶ Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.¶ There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement.¶ But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.

### Policy Focus Good

#### The plan’s policy-relevant and consequentialist framing is more effective

Matthew Bolton 16, assistant professor of political science at Pace University; and Elizabeth Minor, researcher at UK‐based NGO Article 36, September 2016, “The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay: The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’ Operationalization of Critical IR Theories,” Global Policy, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 385-395

Within the IR literature there is a perennial admonition to make theory more ‘relevant’ to policy makers, but this is usually cast in problem‐solving terms: producing knowledge that solves the problems faced by the existing political framework. (Lepgold, 1998; Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005; Walt, 2005). Many of those engaged in critical theorizing resist such demands to be ‘useful,’ suspicious of the operationalization of academic work in oppressive systems, and tend towards a position of ‘resistance’ to the system as a whole. Critical security studies scholar Anna Stavrianakis (2012, p. 233) for example, calls on disarmament activists to demand ‘transgressive change that fundamentally alters the social landscape as well as generates concrete improvements’ rather than calling for ‘incremental changes that leave the parameters of an issue untouched’. Given the centrality of discourse to critical theorizing, resistance is often framed not in terms of taking territory, mobilizing bodies, changing legislation, gaining votes or raising money. Rather it tends to focus on the critical deconstruction of oppressive discourse and disruption of existing norms (e.g. Hargreaves, 2012). As a result, many critical IR scholars see their academic work – undermining dominant discourses through their scholarship and teaching – as their primary form of resistance. (Said, 1996).¶ An emerging generation of political actors were educated by post‐positivist and critical IR scholars and conceive of their work self‐consciously in discursive terms. That is, they frame their intervention in the political arena as a deliberate attempt to reshape the way society speaks about and gives meaning to a particular phenomenon, people, group or activity. Occupy Wall Street activists drew upon critical and discursive theories to strategize their symbolic disruption of the neo‐liberal order (Welty, 2013). LGBTQA activists and ‘third wave’ feminists are trying to change dominant discourses of gender and sexuality (e.g. St. Pierre, 2000). However, critical theory has had less impact on the realm of international military and security policy, which remains heavily influenced by realist thought (Cooper, 2006).¶ As critical theorizing has begun to be used for solving definable political problems (e.g. Davies, 2012; Merlingen, 2013), what Brown (2013) calls ‘critical problem‐solving theory’, it has eroded Cox's (1981) boundary between ‘problem‐solving’ and critical theories. What happens when a theoretical paradigm that explicitly defines itself in critical opposition is instrumentalized and used in problem‐solving ways? This question, which we begin to explore in this article, is underexamined in the literature (see Weizman, 2012, pp. 185–220 for an important exception).¶ According to the epistemic community literature (e.g. Haas 2004), the education of policy makers can shape their later actions (Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005). Most usefully for this article, it shows how at critical junctures policy makers will turn to experts. Policy makers tend to be less interested in meta‐theory or broad academic debates about an issue. Rather, they look for knowledge that can be used instrumentally to solve a particular policy problem (e.g. Hall, 1993). But moving theoretical ideas from academia, through the activist community, to the policy arena, dilutes the original ideas and reinterprets them in instrumental ways. To help understand this, we draw on postcolonial concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘creolization’ of different ‘knowledge systems’ pushed into contact (Shih and Lionet, 2011, p. 30). We find that some ICAN campaigners responsible for its current strategy have ‘translated’ IR discursive theory into the world of disarmament policy making. In doing so, they selected the aspects of critical security studies ‘to transpose and emphasize’ (cf. Tymoczko, 2000 p. 24) as befit their specific political goals. This creative application of critical theory in a new setting, in its translation of theory into political engagement, may necessarily involve rendering it less threatening to elite audiences, in the process of seeking policy changes (cf. Jeffrey, 2013, pp. 107–131).

#### Policymakers must take national interest above all other interests---it’s the only ethical option

William F. Felice 2008, Professor of international political economy, international law, international organization, and human rights at New York University, “Moral Responsibility in a Time of War”, Social Justice/Global Options, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768499

Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, attempts to distinguish between right and wrong behavior. Ethical theories have been applied to war and violence with "just war" theories influencing policymakers. However, the intellectual framework used by the overwhelming majority of the world's foreign policy decision-makers is an "amoral" calculation of what action best serves the "national interest." The first-rate foreign policy expert will give absolute priority to the interests of his or her nation, which often means neglecting and opposing the material interests of those outside this partial community. Through this lens, policy options pose few moral dilemmas, as these decisions are merely practical solutions to real-world problems. Some who call themselves "political realists" share such a view of the separation of ethics from politics. ¶ To a classical political realist, history demonstrates that states must focus on power and wealth to survive in the international system. Morality has a limited role to play in this anarchical, dangerous world. Since the time of Thucydides in ancient Greece, states have consistently chosen power over negotiated diplomatic agreements, with the "logic of fear and escalation" always pushing out the "logic of moderation and peaceful diplomacy." This overriding priority of "national security" means that ethics plays an extremely circumscribed role in the deliberations of states. Many realists argue that in international politics "only the weak resort to¶ moral argument" (Smith, 1986: 6-7). ¶ Many powerful officials in the U.S. government have stated strongly that, in their view, moral considerations have no place in politics. For example, Dean Acheson, former secretary of state under President Harry Truman, was asked by President Kennedy in 1962 to serve on the Executive Committee to advise the president on an appropriate response to the Cuban missile crisis. Acheson later wrote that during these discussions, when the lives of millions of people were in danger, "those involved...will remember the irrelevance of the supposed moral considerations brought out in the discussions...moral talk did not bear on the problem" (Acheson, 1971; Coady, 1993: 373). Realist counsel has traditionally excluded morality from foreign policy and instead focused solely on the "national interest." Yet, this does not mean that no ethics apply to statecraft. Rather, a difference is accepted in the morals that apply to individuals versus those that apply to the state. An individual can base his or her conduct on principles such as honesty and nonviolence. In contrast, the state must protect its position of "power" in the international system. This means that the state should not engage in ideological crusades for democracy and freedom that could dilute its power. Yet key "realist" virtues enhance the state's power position and thus must be embraced. These ethical norms are said to include prudence, humility, study, responsibility, and patriotism. Such an approach allows leaders to conduct a responsible and tough defense of the national interest, but still show respect for others. The claim made for the cosmopolitan significance of this realist approach has been named "ethical realism." "Ethical realism," according to Lieven and Hulsman (2006: 62-83), "is therefore of universal and eternal value for the conduct of international affairs, and especially useful as a guiding philosophy for the United States and its war on terror."¶ As a representative of the community overall, the government official has a primary obligation to the national interest, and, in particular, the security and integrity of the state. The ethics of "humility" and "prudence" can help to protect the security of the state. However, the necessities of national existence cannot be sorted out through an ethical lens of right and wrong conduct. Effective statecraft demands that officials act to protect the whole, even if individual and collective moral principles are sacrificed. The government official must protect the interests of the community above all else. As a result, according to international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau (1979: 13), there is a "difference in the moral principles that apply to the private citizen in his relations with other private citizens and to the public figure in dealing with other public figures." Many of these "political realists" and/or "ethical realists" seem to embrace Machiavelli’s division of morality between the public and private worlds.

## Turns

### Militarism Good Turn

#### Militarism is good- military deterrence and the willingness to use force will save more lives

Victor Davis Hanson 04**,** Professor of Classical Studies at CSU Fresno, “The Fruits of Appeasement”, City Journal, Spring 2004, http://www.cityjournal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html

The twentieth century should have taught the citizens of liberal democracies the catastrophic consequences of placating tyrants. British and French restraint over the occupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland, and the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia did not win gratitude but rather Hitler’s contempt for their weakness. Fifty million dead, the Holocaust, and the near destruction of European civilization were the wages of “appeasement”—a term that early-1930s liberals proudly embraced as far more enlightened than the old idea of “deterrence” and “military readiness.”

So too did Western excuses for the Russians’ violation of guarantees of free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia only embolden the Soviet Union. What eventually contained Stalinism was the Truman Doctrine, NATO, and nuclear deterrence—not the United Nations—and what destroyed its legacy was Ronald Reagan’s assertiveness, not Jimmy Carter’s accommodation or Richard Nixon’s détente.

As long ago as the fourth century b.c., Demosthenes warned how complacency and self-delusion among an affluent and free Athenian people allowed a Macedonian thug like Philip II to end some four centuries of Greek liberty—and in a mere 20 years of creeping aggrandizement down the Greek peninsula. Thereafter, these historical lessons should have been clear to citizens of any liberal society: we must neither presume that comfort and security are our birthrights and are guaranteed without constant sacrifice and vigilance, nor expect that peoples outside the purview of bourgeois liberalism share our commitment to reason, tolerance, and enlightened self-interest.

Most important, military deterrence and the willingness to use force against evil in its infancy usually end up, in the terrible arithmetic of war, saving more lives than they cost. All this can be a hard lesson to relearn each generation, especially now that we contend with the sirens of the mall, Oprah, and latte. Our affluence and leisure are as antithetical to the use of force as rural life and relative poverty once were catalysts for muscular action. The age-old lure of appeasement—perhaps they will cease with this latest concession, perhaps we provoked our enemies, perhaps demonstrations of our future good intentions will win their approval—was never more evident than in the recent Spanish elections, when an affluent European electorate, reeling from the horrific terrorist attack of 3/11, swept from power the pro-U.S. center-right government on the grounds that the mass murders were more the fault of the United States for dragging Spain into the effort to remove fascists and implant democracy in Iraq than of the primordial al-Qaidist culprits, who long ago promised the Western and Christian Iberians ruin for the Crusades and the Reconquista.

#### Militarism is key to leadership and preserving order to check those who threaten the world order

David Brooks 01, a Canadian-born American political and cultural commentator who writes for The New York Times, “Age of conflict,” November 5, 2001, https://www.weeklystandard.com/david-brooks/the-age-of-conflict

Obviously nobody knows what the future years will feel like, but we do know that the next decade will have a central feature that was lacking in the last one: The next few years will be defined by conflict. And it's possible to speculate about what that means. The institutions that fight for us and defend us against disorder -- the military, the FBI, the CIA -- will seem more important and more admirable. The fundamental arguments won't be over economic or social issues, they will be over how to wield power -- whether to use American power aggressively or circumspectly. We will care a lot more about ends -- winning the war -- than we will about means. We will debate whether it is necessary to torture prisoners who have information about future biological attacks. We will destroy innocent villages by accident, shrug our shoulders, and continue fighting. In an age of conflict, bourgeois virtues like compassion, tolerance, and industriousness are valued less than the classical virtues of courage, steadfastness, and a ruthless desire for victory. […continues…] But now violence has come calling. Now it is no longer possible to live so comfortably in one's own private paradise. Shocked out of the illusion of self-reliance, most of us realize that we, as individuals, simply cannot protect ourselves. **Private life requires public protection.** Now it is not possible to ignore foreign affairs, because foreign affairs have not ignored us. It has become clear that we are living in a world in which **hundreds of millions** of people hate us, and some small percentage of them **want to destroy us**. That realization is bound to have cultural effects. In the first place, we will probably become more conscious of our American-ness. During the blitz in 1940, George Orwell sat in his bomb shelter and wrote an essay called "England Your England." It opened with this sentence: "As I write, highly civilised human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me." What struck him at that moment of danger was that it really does matter whether you are English or German. The nation is a nursemaid that breeds certain values and a certain ethos. Orwell went on to describe what it meant to be English. Now Americans are being killed simply because they are Americans. Like Orwell, Americans are once again becoming aware of themselves as a nationality, not just as members of some ethnic community or globalized Internet chat group. Americans have been reminded that, despite what the multiculturalists have been preaching, not all cultures are wonderfully equal hues in the great rainbow of humanity. Some national cultures, the ones that have inherited certain ideas -- about freedom and democracy, the limits of the political claims of religion, the importance of tolerance and dissent -- are more humane than other civilizations, which reject those ideas. As criticism of our war effort grows in Europe, in hostile Arab countries, and in two-faced countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which dislike our principles but love our dollars, Americans will have to articulate a defense of our national principles and practices. That debate in itself will shape American culture. We will begin to see ourselves against the backdrop of the Taliban. During the Cold War, we saw ourselves in contrast to the Soviet Union. Back then, we faced a godless foe; now we are facing a god-crazed foe. As we recoil from the Islamic extremists, we may be less willing to integrate religion into political life. That would mean trouble for faith-based initiatives and religion in the public square. On the other hand, democracies tend to become patriotic during wartime, if history is any guide, and this will drive an even deeper wedge between regular Americans and the intellectual class. Literary critic Paul Fussell, a great student of American culture in times of war, wrote a book, Wartime, on the cultural effects of World War II. Surveying the culture of that period, he endorsed the view of historian Eileen Sullivan, who wrote, "There was **no room** in this war culturefor **individual opinions** or personalities, **no freedom of dissent or approval**; the culture was homogeneous, shallow and boring." […continues…] Don't make the mistake of interpreting the events of Sept. 11 purely in terms of terrorism and murder. . . . The terrorists are a virulent subset of a much larger group of anticapitalists, one that includes many politicians, bureaucrats, writers, media types, academics, entertainers, trade unionists and, at times, church leaders. The barbarians at the gates are more numerous than you thought. But the most important cultural effect of conflict is that it breeds a certain bloody-mindedness or, to put it more grandly, a tragic view of life. Life in times of war and recession reminds us of certain hard truths that were easy to ignore during the decade of peace and prosperity. Evil exists. Difficulties, even tragedies, are inevitable. Human beings are flawed creatures capable of monstrosity. Not all cultures are compatible. To preserve order, good people must exercise power over destructive people. That means that it's no longer sufficient to deconstruct ideas and texts and signifiers. You have to be able to **construct hard principles so you can move from one idea to the next**, because when you are faced with the problem of repelling evil, you absolutely must be able to reach a conclusion on serious moral issues. This means you need to think in moral terms about force -- and to be tough-minded. During the Cold War, Reinhold Niebuhr was a major intellectual figure. In 1952, he wrote The Irony of American History. The tragedy of the conflict with communism, he argued, was that, "though confident of its virtue, [America] must yet hold atomic bombs ready for use so as to prevent a possible **world conflagration**." The irony of our history, he continued, is that we are an idealistic nation that dreams of creating a world of pure virtue, yet in defeating our enemies we sometimes have to act in ways that are not pure. "We take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous action to preserve our civilization," Niebuhr wrote. "We must exercise our power." We have to do so while realizing that we will not be capable of perfect disinterestedness when deciding which actions are just. We will be influenced by dark passions. But we still have to act forcefully because our enemies are trying to **destroy** the basis of civilization: "We are drawn into an historic situation in which the paradise of our domestic security is suspended in a hell of global insecurity." Niebuhr's prescription was humble hawkishness. He believed the United States should forcefully defend freedom and destroy its enemies. But while doing so, it should seek forgiveness for the horrible things it might have to do in a worthy cause. To reach this graduate-school level of sophistication, you have to have passed through elementary courses in moral reasoning. It will be interesting to see whether we Americans, who sometimes seem unsure of even the fundamental moral categories, can educate ourselves sufficiently to engage in the kind of moral reasoning that Niebuhr did. The greatest political effect of this period of conflict will probably be to relegitimize central institutions. Since we can't defend ourselves as individuals against terrorism, we have to rely on the institutions of government: the armed forces, the FBI, the CIA, the CDC, and so on. We are now only beginning to surrender some freedoms, but we will trade in more, and willingly. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, "Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. . . . To be more safe, [people] at length become willing to run the risk of being less free." Moreover, we will see power migrate from the states and Capitol Hill to the White House. "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority," Hamilton continued. This creates rifts on both left and right, because both movements contain anti-establishment elements hostile to any effort to relegitimize central authorities. The splits have been most spectacular on the left. Liberals who work in politics -- Democrats on Capitol Hill, liberal activists, academics who are interested in day-to-day politics -- almost all support President Bush and the war effort. But many academic and literary leftists, ranging from Eric Foner to Susan Sontag to Noam Chomsky, have been sour, critical, and contemptuous of America's response to September 11. The central difference is that the political liberals are comfortable with power. They want power themselves and do not object to the central institutions of government, even the military, exercising power on our behalf. Many literary and academic liberals, on the other hand, have built a whole moral system around powerlessness. They champion the outgroups. They stand with the victims of hegemony, patriarchy, colonialism, and all the other manifestations of central authority. Sitting on their campuses, they are powerless themselves, and have embraced a delicious, self-glorifying identity as the out-manned sages who alone can see through the veils of propaganda in which the powerful hide their oppressive schemes. For these thinkers, virtue inheres in the powerless. The weak are sanctified, not least because they are voiceless and allegedly need academics to give them voices. These outgroup leftists dislike the Taliban, but to ally themselves with American power would be to annihilate everything they have stood for and the role they have assigned themselves in society. […continues…] For Bush, the leader of the free world, the issue is terrorism, not street crime. But now he too is engaged in the effort to restore order so that people can go about their lives. He is the one rounding up the posse, forsaking social issues and other moral debates for a straightforward act of international prosecution. He is reasserting authority to show that under Pax Americana, the world is governable. […continues…] But history never repeats itself neatly. No one can predict the political and cultural consequences of a war, any more than the course of the war itself. But it does seem clear that we have moved out of one political and cultural moment and into another. We have traded the anxieties of affluence for the real fears of war. We have moved from an age of peace to an age of conflict, and in times of conflict people are different. They go to extremes. Some people, and some nations, turn cowardly or barbaric. Other people, and other nations, become heroic, brave, and steadfast. It all depends on what they have in them. War isn't only, as Bourne said, the health of the state. It's the gut-check of the nation.

### Securitization Turn

#### New security frameworks and a move away from securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

Tara **McCormack, ’10**, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states **a more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful sta**tes**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

### Interventionism Good Turn

#### US interventionism is good – it’s the only alternative to mass death.

Rieff 99 (David, World Policy Institute, New York Institute for the Humanities and Council on Foreign Relations, Summer, “A New Age of Liberal Imperialism?” World Policy Journal, Vol XVI No 2, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/rieff2.html)

Finessing the Disaster And yet in Kosovo (this had almost happened in Bosnia), the West was finally hoist on the petard of its own lip service to the categorical imperative of human rights. It was ashamed not to intervene, but it lacked the will to do so with either vision or coherence. Kosovo is probably a lost cause; it is certainly ruined for a generation, whatever eventual deal is worked out, as Bosnia, whose future is to be a ward of NATO, America, and the European Union, probably for decades, has also been ruined for a generation, Dayton or no Dayton. What remains are the modalities through which this disaster can be finessed, and its consequences mitigated. It is to be hoped that in the wake of Kosovo, the realization that this kind of geo-strategic frivolity and ad hoc-ism, this resolve to act out of moral paradigms that now command the sympathy but do not yet command the deep allegiance of Western public opinion-at least not to the extent that people are willing to sacrifice in order to see that they are upheld-will no longer do. To say this is not to suggest that there are any obvious alternatives. Even if one accepts more of its premises than I do, the human rights perspective clearly is insufficient. As for the United Nations, it has been shown to be incapable of playing the dual role of both succoring populations at risk while simultaneously acting like a colonial power and imposing some kind of order and rebuilding civic institutions. The important Third World countries seem to have neither the resources nor the ideological inclination to intervene even in their own regions, as Africa's failure to act in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrated so painfully. The conclusion is inescapable. At the present time, only the West has both the power and, however intermittently, the readiness to act. And by the West, one really means the United States. Obviously, to say that America could act effectively if it chose to do so as, yes, the world's policeman of last resort, is not the same thing as saying that it should. Those who argue, as George Kennan has done, that we overestimate ourselves when we believe we can right the wrongs of the world, must be listened to seriously. So should the views of principled isolationists. And those on what remains of the left who insist that the result of such a broad licensing of American power will be a further entrenchment of America's hegemony over the rest of the world are also unquestionably correct. What Is to Be Done But the implications of not doing anything are equally clear. Those who fear American power are-this is absolutely certain-condemning other people to death. Had the U.S. armed forces not set up the air bridge to eastern Zaire in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of thousands of people would have perished, rather than the tens of thousands who did die. This does not excuse the Clinton administration for failing to act to stop the genocide militarily; but it is a fact. And analogous situations were found in Bosnia and even, for all its failings, in the operation in Somalia.

### Perm Solvency – Movements

#### Only the perm solves – movements fail without showing credible political alternatives, and their anti-reformist ideological purity prevents true democracy.

Teivainen 5 [Teivo Teivainen, professor of World Politics at the University of Helsinki, “The World Social Forum: Arena or Actor?”, Chapter 11 in Charting transnational democracy : beyond global arrogance / edited by Janie Leatherman and Julie Webber, 2005, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781403981080]

Being anti-something can be politically useful, but only up to a point. The protesters of Seattle and similar events have been very effective in pointing out authoritarian aspects of the capitalist world-system. Even if various groups that have participated in these events do have programmatic statements for alternative futures, the way these events have been staged has not been very conducive in showing these futures to the world. The criticism of not being able to show a credible alternative, or any alternative at all, has become a problem for the legitimacy of the protest movements.

In most of the post-Seattle events, the protesters have often been labeled as “antiglobalization,” and some of them have used the expression themselves. 24 It would, however, be analytically faulty and politically unwise to simply define the movements as being against globalization, if the term is understood as the increasing transgression of nation-state borders on a worldwide level. Many of them are, I would claim, looking for a different kind of globalization, though some may prefer to use the older term internationalism. From a democratic perspective, the problem in some antiglobalization rhetoric is that one easily ends up with rather strange bedfellows. Professing antiglobalization pure and simple is not very helpful in terms of making a distinction between regulating the cross-border movements of speculative capital and those of black immigrants.

Outra globalização (another globalization) is an expression that has been emphasized by some of the key organizers of the Porto Alegre meetings (Grzybowski 1998; de Souza Santos 2001). Despite their insistence, the mass media in many parts of Latin America often talks of antiglobalization activists when referring to both Porto Alegre and some of the events inspired by it. The February 2001 protests related to a WEF regional meeting in Mexico and the March 2001 marches around the Inter- American Development Bank meeting in Santiago de Chile were the first big globalization-related protest events in Latin America after the first WSF, and the media coverage of them often referred to the Porto Alegre event as an important moment in the antiglobalization struggles.25

For those who want to argue for the possibility of a different kind of globalization, the risk of ending up with strange bedfellows is by no means absent. It is not always easy to see the differences, if any, of the “alternative” globalization proposals with the idea of many business leaders that some democratization is necessary in order to make the global expansion of capitalism acceptable (Falk and Strauss 2001). Those who cling to antiglobalization discourse are often right when they claim that the alternative globalization strategies would only lead to very moderate changes. Often, but not always.

It is frequently assumed that in the anti/alternative divide of globalization debates, being “anti” represents more radical and revolutionary options, whereas the “alternatives” are on the side of more superficial reforms. In terms of thinking about how to democratize the world, this assumption is not very helpful. Within the alternative globalization specter, it is possible to find and even easier to imagine such political projects that strive for a globalization that radically transforms the world. While antiglobalization people can be pro-capitalist, pro-globalization people may be anticapitalist.

Some of the debate and divide between the “anti” and the “alternative” is due to confused semantics or distorted categorizations. In order to fundamentally democratize the world, people who have chosen to regard globalization as a term that has been too polluted by its dominant usage and those who think it can still be given more progressive meanings can often work together. In principle, the WSF offers many opportunities for this to happen.